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Abstract—Mixed Flash and JavaScript content has become increasingly prevalent; its purveyance of dynamic features unique to
each platform has popularized it for myriad web development projects. Although Flash and JavaScript security has been examined
extensively, the security of untrusted content that combines both has received considerably less attention. This article considers this
fusion in detail, outlining several practical scenarios that threaten the security of web applications. The severity of these attacks
warrants the development of new techniques that address the security of Flash-JavaScript content considered as a whole, in contrast
to prior solutions that have examined Flash or JavaScript security individually. Toward this end, the article presents FlashJaX, a
cross-platform solution that enforces fine-grained, history-based policies that span both Flash and JavaScript. Using in-lined reference
monitoring, FlashJaX safely embeds untrusted JavaScript and Flash content in web pages without modifying browser clients or using
special plug-ins. The architecture of FlashJaX, its design and implementation, and a detailed security analysis are exposited.
Experiments with advertisements from popular ad networks demonstrate that FlashJaX is transparent to policy-compliant
advertisement content, yet blocks many common attack vectors that exploit the fusion of these web platforms.
Index Terms—Access controls, ActionScript, Flash, in-lined reference monitors, JavaScript, online advertising, scripting, Web security
Ç
1 INTRODUCTION
JAVASCRIPT (JS) and Adobe ActionScript (AS) (the lan-guage for authoring Flash applet content) are two widely
used platforms for developing web content. According to
recent surveys on w3techs.com, 92 percent of all websites use
JS and 23 percent of them use AS, demonstrating the popu-
larity of these platforms for web development.
Due to these two platforms’ popularity, much of today’s
web contains mixed JS-AS content—untrusted code that
combines AS and JS. Such code is extensively used in inter-
active advertisements, embedded third-party videos, and
plugins for content-management systems such as Word-
Press and Joomla. The popularity of such content stems in
part from interactive and multimedia features that are
uniquely available through each platform. Mixed AS-JS con-
tent leverages the benefits of both: the interactive features of
JS for click-tracking and context customization, and the
multimedia features of Flash for improving user experience.
Hosting sites that include such third-party content must
deal with the security and privacy issues that such inclu-
sions introduce. Major concerns include confidentiality of
private client data (e.g., cookies), integrity of host- and user-
owned content, and availability of hosting site services (e.g.,
ads must not deter users from visiting the site).
The prior literature includes extensive research on secur-
ing third-party web inclusions, but most solutions focus on
JS content. These include transformation of untrusted code
(e.g., [1], [2]), security reference monitors (e.g., [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7], [8]), and safe subsets of JS (e.g. [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14]). To a lesser extent, there have also been efforts to secure
Flash/AS inclusions [15]. But in spite of these efforts, the
security ofmixed AS-JS content is relatively less researched.
Meanwhile, the abuse of mixed AS-JS content for mali-
cious campaigns constitutes a significant rising threat for
content currently in circulation [16]. For example, a Gmail
vulnerability allowed attackers to steal sessions by exploit-
ing the AS-JS interface [17]. A WordPress attack (CVE-2012-
3414) exploits vulnerable AS-to-JS interface calls. A recent
study found that 64 of over 1,000 top sites contain Flash
applications vulnerable to JS XSS attacks [18]. (Our evalua-
tion discusses other real-world attacks).
A deeper examination of these attacks reveals that any
defense against attacks arising from AS-JS interactions
must adopt a holistic view of the security-relevant events
on both platforms. Prior work developed for JS or Flash
has not been designed with this holistic perspective, and
therefore does not satisfactorily address security issues
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arising from mixed AS-JS content. The problem of pre-
venting malicious behaviors that exploit combined AS-JS
technologies has therefore remained open.
Problem scenario. To illustrate the security challenges out-
lined above, consider a page publisher P who supports her
site via embedded advertisements purveyed by an ad net-
work N . Publisher P trusts neither the ads (some of which
may be malicious) norN (which may fail to filter some mali-
cious ads, and whose ad-loading code might contain
exploitable vulnerabilities). To protect the integrity and rep-
utation of her site and retain clientele, P wishes to protect
her clients from this potential malicious content.
Unfortunately, P cannot assume that all her clients take
all available steps to protect themselves from the dangers
that malvertisements pose. For example, some clients prob-
ably use un-patched browsers with known vulnerabilities.
Finally, some of the policies P must enforce are specific to
P ’s site or page content. For example, on a page that uses
pop-up windows for legitimate navigation, P may wish to
disallow all ad-generated pop-ups, which could fool clients
with phishing attacks that impersonate the legitimate pop-
ups. P wishes to protect her clients as much as possible
given these realities.
To host ads, N requires P to copy N ’s JS ad-loading code
onto her published pages. When this code is served to cli-
ents and executed, it dynamically modifies the hosting page
within the browser to display dynamically chosen ads
(implemented in JS, Flash, or both) served either by N or
directly from advertisers. Since the ad-loading code requires
dynamic read and write access to the hosting page, it must
not be placed in a protected iframe, nor may it be enclosed in
any page element that disallows scripting. Such measures
effectively deactivate ads, depriving P of most or all ad rev-
enue. Likewise, many ads heavily use Flash-JS interaction
(e.g., for click-tracking, contextual customization, and mul-
timedia); therefore P must not disable such interaction lest
it block many legitimate ads, losing significant ad revenue.
Our approach. FlashJaX provides publisher P a means to
enforce custom security policies on untrusted third-party
ad and ad network content without deactivating the critical
functionalities, like scripting and JS-Flash interaction,
required by most ads. To use FlashJaX, P adds a hscripti
tag near the top of her published pages, which dynamically
loads the FlashJaX IRM on client browsers before any other
scripts run. She also statically labels any trusted, protected
page content (e.g., publisher-authored JS code or Flash
objects) with the owning principal (expressed as a princi-
pal-identifying html class attribute). Unlabeled Flash and JS
code is, by default, fully untrusted by FlashJaX. Finally, she
may write page-specific policies (detailed in Section 4) that
define the events and event-traces that each principal may
exhibit. To secure untrusted Flash content, P also hosts or
accesses a trusted ad-proxy service that dynamically installs
the FlashJaX IRM into untrusted Flash ads served to clients.
At runtime, the FlashJaX IRM dynamically monitors all
untrusted JS and Flash code executed on client machines to
enforce P ’s policies. As an example of such monitoring, con-
sider the pop-up prevention policy mentioned above, which
prohibits ad principals from exhibiting pop-ups but permits
trusted publisher code from doing so. Pop-ups are imple-
mented via a limited collection of JS Document Object
Model (DOM) and Flash runtime API services. FlashJaX
monitors these services by intercepting calls and checking
the impending operation against the acting principal’s pol-
icy. FlashJaX passes the call through to the browser’s under-
lying JS/Flash VM only if the principal’s policy permits it.
To track the current principal, FlashJaX enforces history-
based policies that constrain dynamically generated code
and the events it exhibits. For example, a Flash ad owned by
principal A that dynamically generates JS code that creates a
new script within a region of the page owned by principal B
must be successfully monitored by FlashJaX and constrained
by policy A, not B. Such dynamic script generation is
extremely common; almost all real-world ads and ad net-
works perform many layers of dynamic script generation
and html tree manipulation as they execute. Therefore, moni-
toring and constraining history-based policies (i.e., those that
constrain event histories rather than just individual events in
isolation) over dynamically generated, cross-platform code
is a critical challenge addressed by our framework.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 sketches some attack scenarios that motivate securing
the AS-JS interface. Section 3 outlines the FlashJaX architec-
ture and technical approach. Design and implementation
details are described in Section 4, and a security analysis is
summarized in Section 5. Section 6 evaluates the implemen-
tation in terms of effectiveness, compatibility, and perfor-
mance. Related work is discussed in Section 7. Section 8
discusses the relevance of FlashJaX to web security, and
Section 9 concludes.
2 AS-JS INTERFACE ATTACKS
This section describes the AS-JS interface, and details sev-
eral motivating attack scenarios that exploit it.
2.1 The AS-JS interface
AS-JS interaction is implemented by the call and addCallback
methods of Flash’s ExternalInterface runtime class.
AS calls JS method fða1; . . . ; anÞ by invoking callðf;
a1; . . . ; anÞ, where f is a string that is passed uncensored to the
JS VM and evaluated as JS code to obtain a JS function refer-
ence, and where arguments a1; . . . ; an are passed as values.
The evaluation of f as JS code at global scope is a root of
many vulnerabilities in AS-JS cross-language scripts. To
permit JS to call AS, the AS code may invoke addCallback
ðn; cÞ, which registers AS function closure c as callable by JS
under the pseudonym n (a name that is added to the JS
namespace of the html object that embeds the AS script).
Closure c may return a value, which is marshaled and
passed by value back to the JS caller. Together, these facili-
tate two-way communication between AS and JS.
Security for this interface is provided by the allow-
ScriptAccess property of the object and embed tags of
the embedding page, which may be set to always (full
access), sameDomain (same origin access), or never
(none). Same origin access is the default. Additionally, by
default JS may only call an AS closure registered with add-
Callback if the caller and callee originate from the same
domain. AS callees may adjust this restriction using the
allowDomainmethod of the Flash runtime’s Security class.
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While useful in some settings, these security features are
too coarse to distinguish malicious from non-malicious
behavior in many contexts. Disallowing all AS-JS interaction
or limiting it to same origin access breaks a large percentage
of legitimate advertisement scripts. Therefore many ads
and publishers resort to allowing all access, inviting attacks.
The following sections introduce several attacks that
exploit the AS-JS interface. Such attacks can only be pre-
vented by defenses that span both domains. While the
examples focus on AS-JS interface attacks, FlashJaX also
prevents attacks launched purely from JS or AS. However,
to highlight the novelty of our system over prior works that
can only guard each platform in isolation, we focus our dis-
cussion here on attacks that involve the interface.
2.2 Threat Model
Publishers such as Gmail that display third-party content on
client browsers are exposed to a wide variety of threats. It is
therefore important to clarify our threat model, specifically
on the nature of the protections we offer and the threats that
are outside our scope.
In-scope threats. Our broad goal in this effort is to equip
publishers with the ability to place restrictions on third-
party content. Publishers need this ability, for instance, to
ensure that third party content would not cause harm by
compromising the integrity of first-party content. For
instance, we would like to empower a publisher such as NY
Times to place restrictions on third party ads in their ability
to modify site-owned content. We also would like to give
publishers the ability to use our framework to enforce con-
tent confidentiality policies. For instance, a publisher like
Gmail can enforce a policy that prohibits ads that read email
messages from subsequently communicating with any other
untrusted principals.
Although the system we describe in this paper is capable
of enforcing a broad range of content restriction policies, we
primarily discuss its relation to the new attack surface
explored in this paper—the AS-JS interface—for reasons of
novelty and to explore this vector in depth. The remainder
of this section motivates the importance of this threat vector
with a discussion of attacks.
Out-of-scope threats. We omit threats for which publish-
ers can readily deploy strong protections based on prior
work, or for which appropriate policies are client
browser-specific and therefore not amenable to specifica-
tion or enforcement by publishers. Such threats include
behavioral tracking attacks that abuse cookies (which cli-
ents can address by configuring their browsers’ cookie
policies to desired privacy levels), cross-site request forg-
ery (CSRF), or attacks through side channels (such as vis-
ited links or timing channels).
2.3 Motivating Attack Scenarios
Attack #1: Circumvention of SOP. The AS and JS VMs both
enforce Same Origin Policies (SOPs) that prohibit cross-
domain interactions. However, AS and JS SOPs have
slightly different semantics [19] due to their differing com-
putation models, and these can presently be exploited to cir-
cumvent SOP on either side.
For example, a malicious Flash ad can circumvent AS’s
SOP to contact a victim third-party site by dynamically
crafting a malicious JS script and passing it to the JS VM via
Flash’s external interface. The malicious JS script accesses
the browser’s DOM API to create a new hscripti node (e.g.,
using appendChild or document.write). This new node
has a src attribute whose URL references the third-party
victim site. The URL can additionally contain information
passed from the AS applet to the third-party site. The new
node is not subject to AS’s SOP, so it successfully contacts the
remote site and retrieves the result, which is communicated
back to the AS side using the external interface. The attacker
thereby escapes AS’s SOP to perform two-way communica-
tion with the victim, which can be exploited to launch click
forgery, resource theft, or flooding attacks.
This malicious behavior cannot be recognized by single-
platform detection on either the AS or JS side, since AS per-
mits (and ads regularly use) AS-to-JS communication, and
JS permits (and ads regularly use) dynamic script genera-
tion. A cross-platform solution is required to link these two
steps together and detect the SOP violation.
Attack #2: Malicious payload injection from Flash. Heap-
spraying is a form of code injection attack that first allocates
large regions of malicious payload code into a victim VM’s
heap, and then exploits a control-flow hijack vulnerability
(e.g., buffer overflow) to branch to the injected payload.
Address space randomization and other protections prevent
attackers from reliably learning the addresses of these
injected payloads, but if the payload is large enough and
has enough entry points, a randomly corrupted control-
transfer targets it with high probability.
Since some vulnerabilities are previously unknown (i.e.,
zero-day), signature-matching malware protections often
attempt to detect the payload injector instead, because it is
larger and easier to identify using monitoring mechanisms.
However, malware authors have been frustrating these
defense efforts by using cross-language heap-spraying
attacks [20]. In this scenario, the attacker implements AS code
that sprays the JS VM’s address space. The exploit is then
implemented separately in JS. Identification of such attacks
requires cross-platform solutions that can piece together
the two separate halves of the attack implementation.
Attack #3: Cross-principal resource abuse. Publishers often
embed ads from multiple ad networks. This exposes the
publisher and ad network to attacks from the (possibly less
trustworthy) ads hosted by another network if those ads
abuse AS-JS interaction to hijack shared DOM resources or
functions exposed by victim scripts.
Although Flash scriptsmay control access to their exposed
functions, such as by calling allowDomainðhdomainsiÞ to
admit only JS callers from hdomainsi , the coarse granularity
of these facilitiesmakes it extremely common for ad develop-
ers to use them imprudently, such as by supplying wildcard
“*” for hdomainsi, which permits universal access [21]. This
makes the AS functions accessible in the JS global scope,
allowing them to be invoked by all untrusted JS code.
Hosting sites cannot effectively filter ads by the quality of
their underlying implementations, so inevitably some vul-
nerable ads become embedded in the served pages on the
client side, exposing the clients to attack. For example, a
malicious JS advertisement, even if sandboxed in the JS
domain, can call such exported functions. This affords the
ad illegitimate access to DOM objects if the exposed AS
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functions access or manipulate those objects in the DOM.
Prevention of this attack requires the ability to attribute
principals to actions across the AS-JS interface.
The above scenarios illustrate the need for cross-lan-
guage monitoring. It is clear that JS sandboxing methods
alone cannot prevent the attacks in scenarios #1-3. These
scenarios involve the AS-JS boundary, which is typically
outside the scope of approaches aimed at sandboxing
purely JS or AS code. The next section describes how
FlashJaX’s architecture prevents these malicious scenarios.
3 ARCHITECTURE
3.1 Overview
FlashJaX affords publishers a fine-grained mechanism to
safely embed untrusted JS andAS content in theirweb pages.
To avoidmodifying the client browser or VMs (whichwould
introduce significant deployment barriers), we adopt an in-
lined referencemonitoring approach. In-lined ReferenceMoni-
tors (IRMs) [22] modify untrusted code to enforce security
policies from the inside. The resulting code is self-monitoring,
and can therefore be safely executed on standard browsers
and VMswithout additional client-sidemonitoring.
FlashJaX’s IRM consists of JS and AS code introduced by
the embedding page. The IRM mediates security-relevant
events exhibited on the client, permitting or denying them
based on a provider-specified policy.
A na€ıve design implements separate IRMs for JS and
AS; however, this approach has many drawbacks. To
enforce policies involving a global event history, separate
IRMs must ensure that their security states are synchro-
nized at every decision point. This raises difficult race
condition and TOCTTOU vulnerability challenges, and
impairs performance.
To avoid this, FlashJaX centralizes security state-tracking
to the JS half of the IRM, and implements an AS side that
shifts the significant policy decisions to the JS side. This is
efficient because most security-relevant AS events include
AS-JS communication as a sub-component; the IRM there-
fore couples its AS-JS communications atop these existing
ones to avoid unnecessary context-switches.
Fig. 1 summarizes the resulting architecture. The Flash-
JaX components (shaded) consist of JS and AS event media-
tors, and a JS policy engine. The former intercept events
from untrusted JS and AS, respectively, whereas the latter
tracks event history and makes policy decisions.
Step 1 of the figure depicts the exhibition of a security-rele-
vant event op by the untrusted JS or AS code, which is inter-
cepted by the IRM. If the event occurs on the AS side, the AS
IRM implementation consults the JS side in step 2. The JS-side
IRM intercepts the event or AS-to-JS communication and con-
sults a principal-specific policy in step 3. The policy engine
updates the security state and yields a true/false answer in
step 4, causing the operation to be permitted or suppressed.
As an example, an embedded AS ad might exhibit an
op that spawns JS code that tries to overwrite the publish-
er’s DOM. In a typical browser environment, there is
nothing to prevent a malicious ad from successfully
attacking its embedding page in this way. However, on a
page equipped with FlashJaX, the ad’s JS code is inter-
cepted by the IRM and executed at a lower privilege level
than the publisher. When the unprivileged write-opera-
tion is intercepted, the policy engine determines that the
acting principal lacks write-access to publisher-owned
content, and suppresses the operation.
3.2 Technical Approach
The example above illustrates three essential capabilities of
the IRM: It must (1) protect its programming and other pub-
lisher-provided page content from harm, (2) guard access to
all security-relevant operations, and (3) attribute guarded
events and page content to acting/owning principals. We
henceforth refer to these three capabilities as IRM tamper-
proofing (i.e., integrity enforcement), complete mediation, and
principal-tracking, respectively. In addition, to enforce multi-
principal, history-based policies, the IRM must track both
principal-specific and global security states. This section
discusses our technical approach to achieving these goals.
FlashJaX implements a JS/AS cross-language IRM that
constrains untrusted script access to the DOM API—func-
tions and data properties that JS scripts access to manipulate
the page and browser. AS code cannot access the DOM
directly; instead, it submits strings to the JS VM via Flash’s
external interface, which are executed as JS code at global
scope. The heart of our IRM is therefore a JS-side implemen-
tation that guards access to the DOM and tracks security
state, while the AS half redirects external interface accesses
to the JS half.
In addition to tamper-proofing and complete mediation,
which are established challenges for any IRM, our enforce-
ment of multi-principal policies introduces significant chal-
lenges associated with principal-tracking. Accurate principal-
tracking is challenging because modern ad scripts are highly
dynamic, performing many layers of event-driven runtime
code generation as they execute. Solutions that conservatively
reject or lose principal information for dynamic code are
therefore impractical because they breakmost ads.
We now describe each of these capabilities of FlashJaX at
a high level. Section 4 discusses implementation details.
3.2.1 Tamper-Proofing
Tamper-proofing ensures that the IRM’s internals are
unavailable to untrusted content. This is enforced differ-
ently at the JS and AS layers as described below.
At the JS layer, tamper-proofing is achieved by placing
most of the IRM’s implementation inside an anonymous JS
Fig. 1. FlashJaX architecture. Trusted components are shaded;
untrusted (monitored) components are unshaded.
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function closure, as illustrated in Listing 1. Declarations
beginning with the var keyword are strictly local to the
closure’s scope, and therefore cannot be accessed by JS code
outside that scope unless the local scope explicitly exports
global aliases to them. This enables the IRM to enforce a
protected interface for its internal implementation.
A similar approach suffices to tamper-proof the AS
half of the IRM. The majority of the AS IRM is imple-
mented as a sealed, final, monitor class in a dedicated
namespace. AS type-safety and object encapsulation
therefore prevent untrusted code from accessing the mon-
itor class’s private members.
(function(){ // begin local scope
var principal = ”bottom”;//protected principal-tracking var
getPrincipal = function(){ // export global get-accessor
return principal;};
var wrap_window = function(w) { // wrap security-relevant op
var o_open = w.open;
w.open = function(){
if (isAllowed(principal, ”open”, arguments))
return wrap_window(
o_open.apply (this, arguments));
else return null; }
return w;}
wrap_window(window);
})(); // close and execute local scope
Listing 1. A tamper-proof local scope.
3.2.2 JavaScript Mediation
FlashJaX mediates DOMAPI events by wrapping them with
guard functions that consult the policy before forwarding
the request to the DOM. To achieve complete mediation, the
IRM assigns wrappers to all aliases of these security-rele-
vant functions before any untrusted code runs. Aliases
include static names and properties of dynamically created
window objects (e.g., frame and iframe). Although some
static aliases are browser-specific, all aliases of a given secu-
rity-relevant operation can typically be captured by wrap-
ping the properties of a single root object atop the JS
prototype inheritance chain [23]. The wrapper assignment
code is placed first on the page so that it is guaranteed to
run prior to any untrusted code. Dynamically generated ali-
ases are captured by mediating all DOM functions that can
generate window objects, and wrapping any fresh aliases
they introduce before returning control to untrusted code.
Data property accesses are guarded using JS setters and
getters, which trigger specified handler code whenever an
operation would otherwise read or write a given property.
3.2.3 ActionScript Mediation
The AS half of our IRM guards AS-to-JS control-flows by
statically in-lining an external interface wrapper class into
untrusted AS code at the binary level. FlashJaX’s binary
rewriter automatically, statically replaces all bytecode oper-
ations that access the external interface with ones that access
the wrapper class instead. This affords the wrapper class
complete mediation of all AS-to-JS flows.
Static identification of class member references can be
complicated by the fact that AS binaries frequently generate
references dynamically (e.g., from strings). Malicious code
can use such dynamic generation to obfuscate references,
concealing them from static analyses.
To avoid these complications, our rewriter therefore
guards references to the external interface’s namespace rather
than its classes or members. The namespace part of a refer-
ence is almost never generated dynamically. (The only AS
mechanism for doing so requires a static reference, making
it statically identifiable.) This approach greatly reduces the
amount of in-lined code, improving performance and pro-
viding a natural resistance to reference obfuscation attacks.
Thus, all JS events invoked by AS are labeled with the
originating principal and mediated by the JS IRM, so that
the policy engine can apply the correct policy for each prin-
cipal. For example, to block attack scenario #1 (Flash
circumvention of SOP), the AS IRM labels each AS-to-JS
communication with the acting principal, allowing the JS
IRM to enforce a whitelist policy that maps each principal
to the domains it may access.
Rewriting AS binaries changes their origins; but this is not
a problem because, as discussed in Section 2, communicating
Flash applets can opt-out of SOP enforcement whenever the
sender and receiver agree. This allows the IRM to enforce a
different SOP that constrains communications as if the app-
lets had their original origins. If an ad must open direct com-
munication channels back to the advertiser’s server, the
advertiser can unobtrusively accommodate this via a cross-
domain policy [24]. (Note that this is transparent to ad net-
works, since their communications with ads are facilitated by
network-served JS code, not advertiser-authoredAS code.)
3.2.4 Principal Tracking and Event Attribution
On pages with multiple ads, each ad principal is governed
by a distinct policy. Enforcing such multi-principal policies is
necessary to prevent scenarios such as cross-principal
resource abuse (scenario #3 of Section 2).
FlashJaX therefore deploys multi-principal tracking and
event attribution as follows. Whenever trusted code (e.g.,
the page publisher content) introduces untrusted code (e.g.,
by loading an ad), the untrusted code is launched using the
IRM’s runAs method, which defines and maintains the
code’s principal in a protected shadow stack. The shadow
stack stores a list of principal identifiers, one for each runAs
frame on the JS VM’s call stack. The IRM’s runAsmethod is
the only means by which the privilege level changes, and is
strictly local to the IRM; untrusted code may not call it
directly. The policy manager can read the shadow stack to
identify the principal responsible for each event exhibited
by the code, and thus apply a principal-specific policy.
Dynamic runtime code generation is a great challenge for
principal tracking. FlashJaX addresses this by catching all run-
time code generation channels and wrapping them in new
calls torunAs. We discuss this inmore detail in Section 4.3.
3.2.5 Policy Engine
FlashJaX enforces publisher-specified policies on third party
content, and therefore requires a policy language that sup-
ports the following.
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Multi-principal, cross-language policies. Attack scenario #1
of Section 2 entails a sequence of inter-principal, cross-
language communications. To enforce such policies,
FlashJaX must track policy-relevant actions within and
across both the AS and JS platforms, and attribute actions
to acting principals.
Stateful policies. Scenario #1 also has the characteristic that
although each step is permitted in isolation, the full sequence
of steps is impermissible. Such policies cannot be expressed
as a static list of access control rules [25], [26], [27]; an ade-
quate policy language must capture the evolving security
state of the system. Such policies are most commonly
expressed as finite state automata (FSAs) [22], [26], [28].
Fine-grained control. Many security-relevant page resour-
ces are stored within a single, monolithic data structure—
the document tree. To guard such resources, the policy lan-
guage must support fine-grained controls. For example,
publishers may restrict a principal’s access to entire element
subtrees, individual elements, or both.
Custom policies. We also require first-class support for
publishers to author custom policies based on emerging
threats. Although a fixed list of rules might support the
specific policy instances described in this article, it will
not generalize to the needs of all publishers and to future
threats. For example, to block heap-sprays (scenario #2 of
Section 2), publishers may need to write custom content-
filtering predicates that mine binary data for newly dis-
covered malware indicators.
To meet these requirements, FlashJaX expresses policies
as FSAs that track security state based on past events. The
FSAs recognize languages of permissible traces, where a
trace is a sequence of principal-event pairs, and each event
is a DOM operation parameterized by its argument values.
Our policies are powerful enough to detect and prevent a
wide range of attacks, including the attack scenarios
described earlier. A detailed exposition of policy specifica-
tions and their expressiveness is provided in Section 4.4.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes implementation details of FlashJaX
that have been briefly introduced in the previous section.
4.1 JavaScript Wrappers
FlashJaX implements wrappers to mediate DOM API
access. Listing 1 illustrates a wrapper that guards the win-
dow.open DOM function, which creates a pop-up window,
by assigning window:open ¼ f , where f is a function that
creates the requested window if and only if the current
principal’s policy permits it. Thereafter, all calls to win-
dow.open call wrapper f instead.
Na€ıve JS wrapper implementations are known to be vul-
nerable to a variety of attacks, including prototype poisoning
and caller-chain abuse [4], [7], [23]. FlashJaX therefore
employs secure wrapper implementations advanced by
prior work [23]. In summary, these safe wrappers:
1) wrap all aliases of each security-relevant operation,
2) coerce all untrusted inputs to expected types, and
3) only call securely stored copies of JS API methods
(e.g., those of Function and Array), which are care-
fully protected from attacker corruption.
FlashJaX augments these secure wrappers to additionallymedi-
ate events from AS, and to precisely attribute events to the cor-
rect principal, even if the event-exhibiting code was generated
dynamically. As a result, FlashJaX is tamper-proof against
common exploits such as those described in [7].
For data property access mediation, FlashJaX leverages
ECMAScript 5’s defineProperty function [29, Section
15.2.3.6] to define setters and getters for a given property.1
The getters and setters read and store values to protected,
locally-scoped, principal-specific copies of each guarded
property. The guarded properties are set non-configurable so
that untrusted JS code cannot remove or change the guards.
Global variables introduced by scripts are similarly pro-
tected from abuse by other scripts by adding non-configura-
ble getters and setters to such variables during privilege-
changes (i.e., within runAs from Section 3.2.4).
A special approach is required to adequately guard the
DOM’s document.cookie property, for which writes
have the side-effect of creating or modifying browser cook-
ies that may persist across sessions, and reads yield lists of
previously written cookies (possibly some from prior ses-
sions). FlashJaX employs two browser-dependent techni-
ques to protect cookies: On browsers that support cloning
of the document node (e.g., FireFox and IE), FlashJaX cre-
ates a local, protected copy of document, which the IRM’s
wrappers henceforth exclusively access to safely read and
write cookies. On browsers that implement cookie facilities
as browser-specific getters and setters of document.
cookie (e.g., Opera), FlashJaX creates local, protected cop-
ies of these getters and setters to mediate access to them.
In both cases, FlashJaX adds custom getters and setters to
the global document.cookie property to provide filtered,
principal-specific views of the cookie store for each
untrusted principal. (The trusted hosting origin’s access is
not filtered.) This confines each untrusted principal’s cookie
accesses to its own cookies.
One browser we tested (Chrome) currently admits nei-
ther approach due to a known browser bug,2 preventing us
from protecting cookies on that browser. However, once
this bug is fixed, FlashJaX’s cookie-protection is expected to
be compatible with all major browsers.
4.2 ActionScript Rewriter
Our AS binary rewriter automatically in-lines wrappers
around all AS-to-JS flows within AS bytecode applets. The
in-lined wrapper class redirects all such flows to a JS method
named fromAS exposed by the JS IRM. For example, a JS call
originally of the form fða1; . . . ; anÞ is translated by the wrap-
per into a JS call of the form fromASðid; s; f; a1; . . . ; anÞ, where
id identifies the principal, s is a one-time secret (discussed
below), f is a JS expression identifying the callee, and
a1; . . . ; an are the arguments to f . The fromAS method then
executes fða1; . . . ; anÞ at privilege id.
Impersonation attack & defense. The fromAS function must
protect itself from impersonation attacks inwhich amalicious
JS principal calls it with a false id. JS callees cannot reliably
1. Safari does not currently comply with this part of the ECMAScript
5 standard, preventing protection of data properties on Safari. How-
ever, the rest of the DOM remains protected.
2. http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=45277
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identify their callers; incoming calls are essentially anony-
mous. Therefore, the fromAS implementation calls-back
the AS applet from which each incoming AS call claims to
originate, asking it to confirm the call. The AS-side IRM
confirms by validating secret s. Secret s is freshly chosen
for each AS-to-JS call, exists only for the lifetime of the con-
firmation process (just a few AS/JS instructions), is tempo-
rarily stored on the AS side in a private field, and exists on
the JS side only as a local argument to fromAS. This keeps
it safe from interception during the limited window when
it is valid.
var shadowStack = [ ]; // Implement a shadow stack as a list.
// Other code may read (but not write) the current principal.
thisPrincipal = function(){
return (shadowStack.length < 1) ? ”bottom” :
shadowStack[shadowStack.length - 1];
}
// Execute closure f at a specified privilege level.
var runAs = function(principal,f) {
shadowStack.push(principal);
f.apply = js.Function.apply;
var r = f.apply(this,
js.Array.prototype.slice.call (arguments,2));
shadowStack.pop();
flush_write(principal);
if (typeof r !== ”undefined”) return r;
}
Listing 2. Shadow stack code. Object js stores original native JS
objects. Exception-handling is not shown.
4.3 Principal Tracking and Event Attribution
Listing 2 sketches FlashJaX’s shadow stack implementation,
by which it tracks principals.
Principal-tracking algorithm. To execute an untrusted func-
tion f at privilege level p, the IRM invokes runAsðp; fÞ,
which pushes principal identifier p onto the shadow stack,
runs f to completion, pops p off the shadow stack, and
returns the result. Note that since f is a closure with its own
context, calling f within the lexical scope of the monitor
does not give it access to anything in the IRM’s local scope.
Its scope is whatever context it had at creation.
As f executes, it may exhibit security-relevant events,
which are intercepted by the IRM. The IRM’s guards consult
thisPrincipal() to determine the principal to whom
each event should be attributed. Based on the result, a prin-
cipal-specific policy is then consulted to determine whether
to grant or deny each event.
The (trusted) embedding page may label static code f
with a principal identifier p, causing the IRM to execute f at
privilege p. Trusted (non-ad), static code is therefore typi-
cally labeled with identifier top (>), which grants full privi-
leges. Untrusted, static code for ads is labeled with ad
principals so that it executes with lesser privileges. Unla-
beled code runs with bottom (?) privileges by default—i.e.,
the intersection of all privileges granted to all the principals.
Dynamically generated code. As callee f runs, it might
modify the page, such as by adding new elements with
event-handlers containing code. The DOM provides several
mechanisms for dynamic page modification (e.g., Node.
appendChild), all of which are monitored by FlashJaX. No
special monitoring is required for eval, since the code it
generates inherits the context of the eval, preserving the
shadow stack. Thus, FlashJaX handles all dynamically gen-
erated code channels. To illustrate, we here consider the
most common and most general one: document:write.
Operation document:writeðsÞ pushes string s directly
onto the head of the browser’s input stream during page-
loading. Browsers execute scripts as soon as they are parsed
during the page-loading process, so these dynamic scripts
run sometime after the generating script writes them but
before the page is fully loaded. (The exact time of execution
is browser-specific.) Ads depend on this behavior, so it is
important to support and preserve it.
1 var flush_write = function(principal){
2 var i = document.createElement(”ins”);
3 i.innerHTML = write_buffer[principal];
4 write_buffer[principal] = ””;
6 foreach element ewithin i do {
7 //Enclose handlers in principal-preserving closures.
8 foreach attribute a of e do
9 if (typeof e.a == ”function”) {
10 var oldHandler = e.a;
11 e.a = function() {
12 var r = runAs(principal, oldHandler);
13 if (typeof r !== ”undefined”) return r; } ;
14 }
16 //Execute scripts at generating principal’s privileges.
17 if (e is a hscripti element) {
18 var newScript=makeFunction(e.textContent);
19 e.textContent = ””;
20 runAs(principal, newScript);
21 }
23 // Wrap any fresh aliases of security-relevant functions.
24 if (e is a hframei or hiframei element) {
25 wrap_window(e.contentWindow);
26 wrap_document(e.contentWindow.document);
27 }
28 }
30 i.owner = principal;
31 document.lastChild.appendChild(i);
// Append i to page.
32 }
Listing 3. Wrapping dynamically-generated code.
To do so, FlashJaX intercepts and buffers strings passed
to document:write (by storing them in the write buffer
variable in Listing 3) without immediately committing them
to the page. Once f completes, runAs calls the algorithm
sketched in Listing 3 to parse these buffered strings, label
the resulting HTML and JS code with the contributing
principal’s identifier, and commit it to the page. To avoid
writing our own parser, we use a trick: Assigning to the
innerHTML property in line 4.3 leverages the browser’s
built-in parser to convert the string into an HTML tree
stored in the body of an hinsi node object.
Listing 3 replaces all code in the new content with clo-
sures that recursively call runAs, so they will run at the
proper privilege level when triggered. For example, lines 11-
13 replace event-handler e.a with such a closure. The JS
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closure semantics guarantee that when this closure is exe-
cuted, principal will equal the principal that generated
the code, and oldHandlerwill execute at its original scope
(not the IRM’s scope). Thus, dynamically contributed code
inherits the privileges of its creator.
Line 18 processes JS code contributed in the body of a
dynamically generated hscripti element. IRM subroutine
makeFunction (implementation not shown) uses JS’s
Function constructor to convert its string argument into a
closure that can be called by runAs. Closures created with
Function always have global lexical scope, and therefore
safely exclude the IRM’s local scope. The new closure is exe-
cuted immediately, since that is how most browsers treat
dynamically contributed scripts.
Ctrl.checkPolicy =
function(principal, event, obj, flags){
localFSM = Ctrl.policies[principal][FSM_CTRL];
return localFSM.checkPolicy(event, obj, flags) &&
globalFSM.checkPolicy(principal, event, obj,
flags);
}
Listing 4. Policy engine controller
In addition to the local hscripti content handled by
Listing 3, the full FlashJaX implementation also handles
remote scripts (specified as a URL in a src attribute) by
loading them through a proxy via XMLHttpRequest and
processing the resulting string as a local script. This step is
omitted from the listing for brevity.
Finally, any dynamically generated window objects
introduce fresh, unguarded aliases to security-relevant
operations protected by the IRM, and are therefore wrapped
with suitable guards by lines 24-27.
4.4 Policy Definition and Enforcement
FlashJaX’s policy engine is implemented in three layers of JS
as depicted in Fig. 2. The bottom layer provides two library
classes, FSM and GlobalFSM, which are built on the FSMJS
library [30]. They provide tools for defining and accessing
policy files within the policy engine.
The next layer defines global and per-principal policies. In
a typical policy file, page publishers define security states,
the initial state, forbidden states (i.e., those rejected by the
security automaton) and the transition relation. There is typi-
cally one policy file per principal, plus a global policy file that
constrains all untrusted principals and their interactions.
The third layer is the Policy Engine Controller, illustrated
in Listing 4, which interfaces the policy engine to the moni-
tor. Publishers assign policies by adding policy class instan-
ces to the Ctrl.policies array in the controller. At
runtime, the controller calls checkPolicy to test whether
the global FSM and acting principal’s local FSM accept the
impending event. If so, the controller updates the FSM
states; otherwise it rejects.
This design accommodates history-based, stateful poli-
cies over events exhibited by multiple principals. Events
include API calls with various arguments (e.g., DOM
objects), and global variable accesses. Some expressive pol-
icy examples are illustrated below.
Formal description. FlashJaX defines and enforces safety
policies expressible as security automata [25] or edit autom-
ata [26] that intervene by suppressing policy-violating
events. (Other interventions are possible, but we have found
suppression to be the most useful and practical for our poli-
cies.) Formally, a FlashJaX policy is a quadruplet hP;E; S;Gi
where P is the universe of principal identifiers, E is the uni-
verse of events, S : P ! RE is a mapping from principals
p 2 P to regular expressions over alphabet fpg  E, and G
is a regular expression over alphabet P E. Regular expres-
sion SðpÞ specifies the language of permissible traces for
principal p, and G specifies the language of globally permis-
sible traces. The system-wide policy is therefore given by
regular expression
T
p2P SðpÞ \G. Intuitively, the policy
identifies the set SðpÞ of event sequences that each individ-
ual principal p may exhibit, and an additional set G that all
untrusted principals as a collective may exhibit.
Policy example. Fig. 3 shows a policy that prevents cross-
platform heap-spraying attacks (scenario #2 of Section 2).
Such attacks conceal themselves by implementing the spray
in AS so that it is not visible to JS analysis tools. The sprayed
payload is then passed across the AS-JS boundary, allowing
malicious JS code to branch to the payload via a JS-side
exploit not visible to AS analysis tools.
The FSA in Fig. 3 prevents such behavior by tracking
the cumulative size of data passed from AS to JS by each
untrusted principal p. When the cumulative transmission
size reaches bound n, future transmissions are rejected.
The policy therefore conservatively rejects applets that
pass suspiciously large quantities of data from AS to JS.
Our experience is that only malicious ads exhibit such
behavior, but a more refined policy could additionally
apply malware detection heuristics to the passed pay-
loads to support non-malicious ads that pass large quanti-
ties of legitimate data to JS.
The FSA for this policy consists of nþ 1 states, where n is
the maximum cumulative transmission bound. (The num-
ber of states is not an implementation burden, since all
nþ 1 can be expressed as a single integer whose values
range from 0 to n.) For brevity, we draw the FSA using the
notation of extended finite automata (XFAs) [31] in Fig. 3.
A global policy can likewise be defined to limit the total
cumulative transmission size of all principals by using *
(denoting any principal) on the edges. This blocks heap
spraying through collusion.
Fig. 2. Policy enforcement system architecture.
Fig. 3. A local FSA for a policy preventing heap-sprays.
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Multi-principal policies. FlashJaX’s label-based attestation
(Section 4.3) facilitates enforcement of some sophisticated
write-protection policies, which can be leveraged to block
cross-principal resource abuses (e.g., scenario #3 of
Section 2). Fig. 4 shows an example with three principals: an
ad network p1, and two ads p2 and p3 served by the network.
Event readðe; pÞ denotes a read from element e labeled p.
The label is assigned dynamically by the IRM’s attestation
mechanism. The FSA on the left allows p2 to read p1’s data
and its own data, but not p3’s data. Similarly, the FSA on the
right prohibits p3 from reading p2. Thus, ads may consult
the ad network but not each other. Wildcard  is used to
denote edge labels ranging over all principals and event
arguments ranging over all values. Self-edges for events
that do not affect the security state are not shown.
Listing 5 shows the policy definition for p2’s FSA, where
s1 is the final state that rejects p2’s attempts to read p3.
ElementWhitelist = [’p1’, ’p2’,’p3’];
fsm = new FSM();
t.init = function(){
fsm.setState(’s0’); fsm.setInitialState(’s0’);
fsm.setState(’s1’); fsm.setFinalState(’s1’);
fsm.setEdge(’s0’, ’s1’, ’readDOM’, ’p3’);
currentState = fsm.getInitial();
}
Listing 5. Policy definition for p2 in Fig. 4
Other policy examples. Using this policy language, we
designed and implemented policies that address several
attack scenarios, including the three attack scenarios
described in Section 2, which abuse AS-JS interactions.
These are described below. As mentioned earlier, these
attacks cannot be prevented by mechanisms in JS or AS
alone. Other policies are discussed in Section 6.3.
To stop Flash circumvention of SOP (scenario #1), Flash-
JaX enforces a principal-based whitelist policy: Each princi-
pal may only communicate with sites defined in a whitelist.
FlashJaX’s principal-tracking and event attribution mecha-
nisms attribute all JS code called from AS. Therefore, Flash-
JaX identifies whether the JS event originates from an AS
principal, and applies an appropriate policy. The policy
enforces SOP by only permitting communications with
whitelisted sites.
To inhibit cross-language heap sprays (scenario #2), Flash-
JaX enforces a multi-principal, history-based, resource-bound
policy: The cumulative AS-JS data transmission by each principal
may not exceed a per-principal bound defined by the policy, and the
total transmission by all principals may not exceed a global bound
defined by the policy. The size of transmissions by eachAS prin-
cipal is tallied by the policy engine. If it exceeds the limit,
FlashJaX destroys the violating Flash object by removing it
from the page to prevent the attack.
To block cross-principal resource abuse (scenario #3),
FlashJaX enforces principal-based access control policies:
Each principal may only access particular page elements. The
legitimate accesses for each principal are defined by a
whitelist of DOM objects. The IRM monitors all DOM tree
accesses and disallows accesses that originate from unau-
thorized principals.
5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
FlashJaX enforces rewrite-enforceable safety policies [27]—
i.e., trace properties that stipulate that some observable,
decidable “bad thing” (possibly contingent upon the his-
tory of past events) must not happen. Security-relevant
events consist of JS API calls and member accesses,
parameterized by their arguments and a principal identi-
fier. Prior work has shown that such policies can be for-
malized as aspect-oriented security automata [28]. Principals
are defined by the embedding page, which provides a
trusted mapping from untrusted scripts to principal iden-
tifiers. Dynamically generated scripts inherit the identifier
of the code that generates them.
The IRM’s ability to enforce these policies is contingent
upon its ability to (1) maintain IRM integrity (i.e., tamper-
proofing), (2) completely mediate security-relevant events,
and (3) accurately attribute events to principals. The
enforcement strategy for each of these goals forms the foun-
dation for enforcing the next, as depicted in Fig. 5. Each tier
of security is described below.
IRM Integrity follows from two core language features:
lexical scoping on the JS side, and object encapsulation
(type-safety) on the AS side. That is, on the JS side, all secu-
rity-critical data and code are stored within the local scope
of an anonymous JS closure. This prevents any outside
access except via accessors explicitly exported as global var-
iables. This accessor collection constitutes the protected
interface to the IRM. Similarly, on the AS side, all security-
critical data and code are stored as private members of a
final, sealed AS class. Integrity of the AS portion of the IRM
therefore follows from the type-safety and object encapsula-
tion guarantees of the AS bytecode language.
Complete Mediation of JS API calls is achieved by moving
all security-relevant API method pointers inside the pro-
tected lexical scope before any untrusted code runs. For a
given security-relevant API method, FlashJaX systemati-
cally explores and wraps all its aliases, including static
names and dynamic aliases (Section 3.2.2). Furthermore,
FlashJaX also wraps all channels generating JS code at
Fig. 4. Local FSAs for a policy that permits ads p2 and p3 to read data
owned by ad network p1 but not data owned by each other.
Fig. 5. Three tiers of FlashJaX security.
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runtime (Section 4.3). Thus, IRM integrity implies complete
mediation of these events; once they are inside the local
scope, they can only be accessed via the protected IRM
interface.
Mediation of data property accesses is via non-configura-
ble JS getters and setters, whose complete mediation is
guaranteed by the JS VM [29, Section 8.7]. It is impossible
for untrusted code to change or delete the properties of
wrapped objects.3 Complete mediation on the AS side is
achieved by statically rewriting all references to the flash.
external, flash.net, and flash.utils namespaces
(except those within the trusted IRM class) before any AS
code runs. This makes it impossible for any untrusted AS
code to acquire a direct reference to any external interface
member; all JS accesses therefore use the AS IRM.
Accurate Event Attribution follows from complete media-
tion of security-relevant events, which include all page- and
code-write operations. The IRM’s write-mediation labels all
dynamically written content with the authoring principal.
JS code is labeled by dynamically replacing it with a closure
that preserves the principal. Thus, when it runs, it inherits
the privileges of its author.
For this labeling to succeed, the IRM must account for
all possible locations where JS code can be dynamically
submitted and stored. For example, if the JS setTimeout
method is inadvertently omitted from the list of mediated
methods, scripts could use it to escape the labeling mech-
anism and run unlabeled code. Since in practice the JS
API has a broad, browser-specific, and ever evolving sur-
face, we consider this to be the most attackable portion of
our system. To make FlashJaX robust against such omis-
sions, unlabeled code therefore always runs at the lowest
privilege level (defined as the intersection of permissions
granted to all principals in the system). Thus, a principal-
tracking failure could lead to conservative rejection, but
never a policy violation.
Correctness of the guard code that enforces each
principal’s policy is facilitated by our choice of an automa-
ton-based policy formalism whose semantics, expressive
power, and correct implementation are extremely well-
established in the literature (cf., [22], [26], [27], [28], [32]).
Our implementation leverages these solid design principles
for high assurance.
6 EVALUATION
6.1 Code and Experiment Settings
The core JS IRM is a 300-line static script atop the hosting
page that wraps DOM functions before untrusted code
runs. The wrappers consist of about 600 more lines that
mediate security-relevant events, including dynamic writes,
by consulting the policy engine. The policy engine imple-
ments FSMs using an adaptation of the fsmjs library [30]
(about 9 K LOC). Each individual FSM-controller contrib-
utes less than 100 LOC.
Our AS binary rewriter is a small (<1 K SLOC) stand-
alone Java application that uses no external libraries except
the Java standard libraries. It injects the wrapper class
(about 700 bytes of pre-compiled AS bytecode) and redirects
all external interface references to the injected wrapper
methods. Rewriting is fast; the median rewriting time is
0.62 ms/K (averaged across 57 Flash ads on a 2.93 GHz,
Intel quad core desktop running 64-bit JDK 1.7.0 atop
Windows 7 SP1 with 4 GB ram), and rewriting increases the
binary size of ads by just 1.24 percent.
FlashJaX code and experiments described in this section
are available at http://www.cs.uic.edu/~phu/projects/
flashjax.
6.2 Compatibility
Our compatibility experiments test whether FlashJaX pre-
serves existing, policy-adherent content in JS, AS, and
mixed AS-JS ads. We performed two sets of experiments to
test a cross-section of ads from various sources:
First, we deployed FlashJaX with ad scripts from four
popular ad networks: Google AdSense, Yahoo! Network,
Microsoft Media Network, and Clicksor. The first three of
these were among the top 15 networks in U.S. market reach
in April 2012, with market reach of 92.2, 80.3, and 76.9 per-
cent, respectively [33]. We ran these ads with and without
FlashJaX to observe their rendering results. All render cor-
rectly with no visible distinctions introduced by monitoring.
No user interactions were visibly affected. This shows that
our prototype can be deployed with real-world ad networks
without loss of functionality.
Second, we tested our AS binary rewriter on 57 Flash ads
harvested from browsing sessions on popular browsers
over several weeks, intended to reflect ads observed by typi-
cal users. Of the 57 ads, 32 interact with JS using Flash’s
external interface to perform tasks such as cookie manipula-
tion, pop-up creation, click tracking, or information
exchange with JS-side ad network support code. Our AS
rewriter successfully injected IRMs into all 57 samples.
6.3 Security
To evaluate FlashJaX’s resilience against attacks, FlashJaX
was deployed and tested against several malicious JS and
AS programs. These include real-world attacks reported on
CVE (http://cve.mitre.org), the attack scenarios introduced
throughout the paper, and other attacks related to wrapper
corruption, confidentiality, integrity, and ad-specific
attacks. Each experiment was conducted by first running
the malicious code without FlashJaX to verify that the attack
is successful. Then the same script was run with FlashJaX to
test whether it is blocked. The attacks and defenses are cate-
gorized and described below, and summarized in Table 1.
6.3.1 Real-World Attacks
We studied two recent real-world attacks reported on CVE:
CVE-2012-3414 (“XSS vulnerability in SWFUpload 2.2.0.1
and earlier”) and CVE-2012-2904 (“XSS vulnerability in
LongTail JW Player 5.9”).
CVE-2012-3414 is a vulnerability in Wordpress 3.3.2 that
allows reflected XSS via a Flash parameter derived from
user input. The attacker can inject arbitrary JS code by pass-
ing it to the applet as a malicious URL string, resulting in
execution of the injected code at the privileges of the hosting
3. In earlier versions of Mozilla browsers, deleting a wrapped object
could silently restore the original object [3]; however, this is no longer
possible with ECMAScript 5’s non-configurable feature [29].
452 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON DEPENDABLE AND SECURE COMPUTING, VOL. 12, NO. 4, JULY/AUGUST 2015
page. However, with FlashJaX added to the content pro-
duced by WordPress, the attack fails. The JS code injected
by the attacker is labeled and executed with the lower privi-
lege of the untrusted Flash, disallowing attacker access to
protected JS functions and page content.
CVE-2012-2904 is a vulnerability in LongTail JW Player
5.9, which is active on over one million web sites. Exploits
inject script text as a parameter of the Flash, executing the
payload at the privileges of the hosting page. FlashJaX, how-
ever, successfully labels the injected code with the untrusted
Flash principal, causing it to execute at the lower (untrusted)
privilege level and denying it access to publisher-protected
resources. Thus, all prohibited JS operations in the payload
are suppressed by themonitor, foiling the attack.
6.3.2 Simulated Attacks
Attack scenarios. We implemented and validated the policies
discussed in Section 4.4. These policies address all three
attack scenarios described in Section 2, preventing the
attacks.
Wrapper attacks.We implemented wrapper attacks identi-
fied by prior works [4], [7], [23], which defeat na€ıve JS wrap-
per implementations by abusing static aliases, dynamic
aliases, and caller-chains. When successful, the attacks pop
up an unmediated alert box. All the attacks failed since
FlashJaX wraps these channels.
Script injection. FlashJaX does not prohibit script injec-
tions; it downgrades them to an untrusted privilege level so
that they cannot perform policy-violating actions. We tested
all script injection channels, including remote script files,
script code, event handlers via document.write, eval,
and script inclusion via appendChild and insertBe-
fore. The experiments show that our principal-tracking
mechanism attributes correct privileges to all the dynami-
cally-generated code. We note here again that scripts with
an unidentified principal run with lowest privileges, and
therefore never violate any principal’s policy.
Confidentiality and integrity attacks. These attacks steal or
modify sensitive data of the hosting page, such as cookies
and protected content. To evaluate these attacks, we
deployed a web email page with a fine-grained access con-
trol policy that prohibits ads from reading the contact list or
changing the email content. Ads that try to do so are suc-
cessfully blocked by FlashJaX in the experiment.
Cookie protection. FlashJaX does not prohibit cookie
access, but each principal may only read and write its own
cookies. Malicious code that attempts to steal cookies
belonging to another principal was evaluated and found to
be unsuccessful.
Ad-specific attacks. We tested numerous attacks specific to
web ads, including clickjacking, oversized/arbitrary ad position-
ing, and resource abuse. Each is described below.
Clickjacking attacks create an invisible iframe that
injects a remote page with an invisible click button [34].
FlashJaX prevents this by enforcing a policy that disallows
creating invisible iframes.
Malicious ads often generate content that is larger than
the maximum allowed by the ad network, or that is posi-
tioned inappropriately on the page (e.g., covering other con-
tent). These actions are prevented by FlashJaX by placing
the ad in a fixed-sized hdivi element whose size it write-
protects. The policy additionally forces the offset of any ad-
generated content to 0 0 and write-protects the offset, pre-
venting the ad from popping up misplaced or mis-sized
dynamic content.
In addition, we enforced other fine-grained policies that
disallow or limit calls, and that filter call arguments to a
whitelist of API methods that are frequently targets of
resource abuse attacks. These include pop-up creators like
window.alert and window.open. FlashJaX correctly pre-
vented these resource abuse attacks.
6.4 PERFORMANCE
Macro-benchmarks. Fig. 6 evaluates the performance over-
head by measuring the total render time to load pages with
and without FlashJaX. The test machine is a 1.6 GHz AMD
Athlon Neo MV-40 Processor laptop with 2 GB RAM run-
ning Chrome 19.0.1084.52 m onWindows 7.
The observed rendering overhead varies widely based on
the content from various ad networks. For Microsoft Media
Network and Yahoo! Ads, the additional overhead is
around 55 percent. However, for Google Adsense and Click-
sor, we consistently observe rendering times that are
actually faster with FlashJaX than without. We investigated
this and found that Microsoft and Yahoo! generate Flash
content, whereas Google and Clicksor generate iframes
TABLE 1
Attack Scenarios and FlashJaX Prevention
Attacks Policy applied FlashJaX
prevents?
AS Circumvention of
SOP
Principal-specific
whitelist
p
Cross-language
Heap-spraying
Principal-specific and
history-based
p
Cross-Principal
Resource Abuse
Principal-specific
access control
p
Wrapper vulnerabilities Wrapping all aliases
p
Confidentiality and
integrity
Principal-specific &
fine-grained access
control
p
Ad-specific Principal-specific &
fine-grained access
control
p Fig. 6. Rendering overheads of unmonitored vs. FlashJaX-monitored
ads.
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that make heavy use of runtime-generated JS content. Our
buffering of dynamic write operations (see Section 4.3)
improves the performance of these dynamic writes, speed-
ing rendering.
Micro-benchmarks. We additionally performed a set of
microbenchmark experiments that measure the overhead of
five monitored JS operations called from AS. Each test ran a
tight loop for 1,000 iterations, and we averaged the results
over five trials. Reading and writing of JS properties (e.g.,
document.cookie) was tested using eval, since the AS-
JS interface only supports JS method access.
Table 2 shows the slow-down ratio of the rewritten Flash
without (column 2) and with (column 3) JS-side monitoring.
The table shows a 3.07-4.47 times overhead for AS-JS
boundary communications. This range compares favorably
with similar microbenchmarks reported by related works
(e.g., overheads of 1-324 times [35], or 0.09-19.54 times [3]).
The inclusion of the JS IRM (column 3) results in a small
additional overhead that is similar, except for the two eval
tests. The overhead is higher for the eval tests because each
iteration invokes the JS IRM twice (once for the eval and
once for its content).
7 RELATED WORK
Behavioral sandboxing. Our FlashJaX framework adopts a ref-
erence monitor approach, which monitors the behavior of
web pages to detect and prevent attacks. There are a number
of such methods in the recent literature [3], [5], [6], [7], [13],
[36], [37], [38]. These works explore many subtle scenarios
that arise when considering security issues in JS. For
instance, JSand [36] isolates untrusted JS by loading it into a
sandbox environment that can only interact with a virtual
DOM. Thus, the policy definition and enforcement are
implemented in a virtual DOM implementation. In contrast,
FlashJaX keeps track of principals for untrusted scripts
within a shadow stack in order to enforce an appropriate pol-
icy at runtime. FlashJaX can therefore handle JS script actions
from AS while JSand cannot, since the latter requires full
source codes of untrusted scripts. Virtual Browser (VB) [37]
mediates third-party JS accesses to the browser via a virtual
browser expressed in JS. The implementation is a variant of a
security reference monitor. Unlike FlashJaX, VB does not
support multi-principal or fine-grained policies for multi-
party web applications, and does not support Flash content.
Isolating third-party content into (often invisible)
iframes and providing a mechanism for cross-domain
communication is an alternative approach to constraining
untrusted scripts. Examples include Adjail [39], Webjail
[40], and Subspace [41]. This technique is unsuitable for
Flash content for performance reasons—transporting
Flash content through browser-supported communication
channels is prohibitively slow.
Configurable Origin Policy (COP) [42] is a recent pro-
posal that allows web developers to associate web pages
with a security principal via a configurable ID in the
browser, so that web applications having a common ID are
treated as same-origin even when hosted from different
domains, such as gmail:com vs. docs:google:com. This
clean-slate approach is a promising one in the design space
of browser security. In contrast to a clean-slate approach
such as COP, FlashJaX follows a design that is compatible
with today’s browsers and Flash interpreters. In general,
since these methods only focus on the JS side, they cannot
prevent attacks exploiting JS-AS interactions.
Similarly, there are several protectionmethods focusing on
privacy and behavioral targeting, such as Privads [43],
Adnostic [44], and RePriv [45], which address user privacy
issues from behavioral targeting. These rely on specialized,
in-browser systems that support contextual placement of ads
while preventing behavioral profiling of users. In contrast,
our work mainly focuses on a different, publisher-centric
problem of protecting confidentiality and integrity of pub-
lisher and user-owned content. Ourwork is also aimed at pro-
viding compatibility with existing ad networks and browsers.
Restricting content languages. There have been a number of
works in the area of JS analysis that restrict content from
untrusted sources to provide security protections [9], [10],
[11], [12], [14], [46]. These works focus on limiting the JS lan-
guage features that untrusted scripts may use. Only those
language features that are statically deterministic and ame-
nable to analysis are allowed. Since these methods restrict
content at a language level, they do not impose the runtime
penalty of reference monitors. In the cases of FBJS [9] and
ADsafe [47], untrusted scripts are confined to an access-con-
trolled DOM interface, which incurs some overhead but
affords additional control.
The disadvantage of a restricted JS subset is that many
ads are unlikely to conform to it, and will therefore require
re-development. In contrast, FlashJaX neither imposes the
burden of new languages nor places restrictions on JS lan-
guage features used in ad scripts. The only effort required
from a publisher that incorporates FlashJaX is to specify pol-
icies that reflect site security practices.
Code transformation approaches. Many recent works have
transformed untrusted JS code to interpose runtime policy
enforcement checks [1], [2], [8], [35], [48], [49]. These works
cover many diverse attack vectors by which third-party con-
tent may subvert the checks. Since these works are aimed at
general JS security, they do not consider the security of the
JS-AS interface and attacks that target this interface.
Browser-enforced protection. A modified browser can be
instructed to enforce security policies, as illustrated by
BEEP [50], CoreScript [51], End-to-End Web Application
Security [52], Content Security Policies [53], and Con-
Script [4]. Other works, such as AdSentry [54], JCShadow
[55], ESCUDO [56], and Tahoma [57], have taken this
approach to prevent attacks by untrusted content. The
main advantage of this approach is that it can enforce
TABLE 2
FlashJaX Micro-Benchmarks Measuring the Ratio of the
Runtimes of FlashJaX-Rewritten Flashes to Originals Without
(Column 2) and With (Column 3) JS-Side Monitoring
Operation Rewritten
Flash
FlashJaX
document.appendChild 3.52 3.59
document.getElementById 4.47 5.17
toString() 4.26 4.47
eval(”document.cookie=’test’”) 3.67 5.91
eval(”document.cookie”) 3.07 6.33
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fine-grained policies with low overhead. However, the
primary drawback is that today’s browsers do not agree
on a standard for publisher-browser collaboration, leav-
ing a large void in the near-term for protecting users
from malicious third-party content.
Safety of ActionScript content. Jang et al. [24] point out the
pervasive nature of misconfigured AS content, particularly
with reference to cross-domain policies. Ford et al. [58]
describe a malware identification approach for Flash ads.
The work that is closest to ours is FIRM [15], which uses
an IRM approach for prevention of Flash-related attacks.
FIRM is strictly limited to AS mediation, whereas FlashJaX
tackles a much broader class, that of mixed AS-JS content.
As a result, our monitor is able to address a much broader
class of attack vectors that target JavaScript as well as
ActionScript (as discussed in Section 2), especially those
that exploit the interface boundary. Since FIRM focuses
purely on AS-side monitoring, it adopts a less conservative
threat model that assumes that some parts of the JS name-
space can be read-protected from adversaries. This relaxed
model admits a capability-based approach, which FIRM
implements using secret tokens that are maintained by the
reference monitor. In contrast, FlashJaX’s threat model
acknowledges that protection of secrets in a JS environment
is hard. There are many different ways through which an
attacker can get read access to the JS namespace (cf., [59]) in
order to gain access to secret tokens. We therefore conserva-
tively assume that adversaries may have the ability to read
the complete JS namespace, and therefore developed a
more robust approach whose security is argued in Section 5.
8 DISCUSSION
This section discusses the relevance of FlashJaX to the larger
landscape of web application security.
Context and relevance. A plethora of threats are faced by
web applications today; the most common include script
injection attacks, heap spraying, drive-by downloads, UI
spoofing, and clickjacking. Extensive research in both
server- and browser-side defenses seek to mitigate these
threats. The work presented in this paper exposes a rela-
tively unexplored threat vector (compared to the threats
mentioned above, which have been well explored).
We have also developed a systematic defense for this
threat using the principled approach of IRMs. Our work can
be seen as a defense that sits in conjunction with existing
browser defenses, including those for JS (e.g., [4]), XSS
attacks, and heap-spraying. FlashJaX strengthens those
defenses by adding protection against a significant attack
vector that these defenses do not address.
Other related browser plugins. Recent surveys indicate that
Flash is the most commonly used browser plugin.4 FlashJaX
provides a systematic way to enforce security on Flash-JS
content. Similar content can be authored in other plugins,
such as Java and Silverlight. Our work could be extended to
Silverlight via similar IRM-based techniques that have been
used for .NET binary rewriting [60].
Deployment. Research efforts such as FlashJaX point out
that the nature of attack surfaces will continue to evolve as
browsers evolve to support new features. As a result, the
nature of policies that security engineers want to enforce is
continuously evolving as well, and there will always be a
need to enforce policies that current browsers do not uni-
versally support. FlashJaX’s approach to security through
IRM enforcement allows for a principled defense mecha-
nism that can be flexibly adapted to address future threats,
while remaining compatible with existing browsers.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented FlashJaX, a solution for enforc-
ing security policies on third-party mixed JS/AS web con-
tent using an IRM approach. FlashJaX allows publishers to
define and enforce fine-grained, multi-principal access poli-
cies on JS-AS third party content and runtime-generated
code. Moreover, it can be easily deployed in practice with-
out requiring browser modification. Experiments show that
FlashJaX is effective in preventing attacks related to AS-JS
communication, and its lightweight IRM approach exhibits
low overhead for mediations. It is also compatible with
advertisements from leading ad networks.
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